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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty years, U.S. companies have begun to require
consumers with little bargaining power to resolve disputes through private
arbitration rather than in court. 1 In fact, one study estimates that the average
American has unknowingly given up their constitutional rights to a public
trial in up to one-third of their consumer transactions. 2 While proponents of
mandatory arbitration say that consumers are provided with a cheaper and
more efficient forum than litigation, 3 many believe that mandatory arbitration
"has given large firms the power to displace the judiciary from its role in
enforcing common law claims and statutory rights." 4 Payday lending
companies are one of the many U.S. industries that have taken advantage of
the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration stance to the detriment of the
customers.5
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I Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1636 (2005).
2 Id. at 1639.
3 Id. at 1633.
4 David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 36-
37 (1997).
5 A victim's story: Earl Milford puts up an artificial Christmas tree in the house he
shares with his son, daughter-in-law, and two grandchildren. There is no money for
presents because Milford is a victim of payday loan easy money. Every month, Milford
travels thirty miles to the city of Gallup and pays sixteen payday lending businesses a
total of $1,500 to cover the interest on his loans. Because New Mexico does not require
lenders to check if customers have borrowed money elsewhere, people like Milford are
allowed to take out many loans at a time. Thus, the cycle of debt begins and continues
until either financial discipline or bankruptcy occurs. Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy,
Payday Loans Often Snowball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at Al.
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Payday loan companies have recently come under scrutiny thanks to
triple digit interest rates and strategic placement in impoverished
neighborhoods. 6 Payday lending businesses have been banned in eleven
states, 7 and as of October 1, 2007, many lenders in the United States,
including payday loan businesses, may not charge more than a 36% interest
rate to active duty military personnel or their families. 8
Mandatory arbitration clauses buried in contracts, where consumers
unknowingly or hastily sign away their right to traditional courtroom
protections in the event of litigation, are part of the payday lending trap.
Mandatory arbitration clauses in payday loan contracts should be ruled
unconscionable by courts. Splits in jurisdictions and the nebulous legal
theory of unconscionability make this argument more difficult than it should
be for payday loan borrowers.
This note will explore the problems with mandatory arbitration clauses in
payday loans and suggests that voluntary mediation would be more suited to
payday lending disputes. Part II will explain the payday loan process. 9 More
specifically, it will describe how payday lending borrowers are trapped in a
cycle of debt which payday lending businesses depend on for their profits.' 0
Why usury laws do not sufficiently protect payday loan consumers will be
discussed in Part 111.11 Part IV analyzes how federal courts have upheld or
denied mandatory arbitration clauses under the legal doctrine of
unconscionability; argues that mandatory arbitration clauses in payday
lending loans should be held unconscionable; and suggests federal legislative
options to remedy the current payday lending loan predicament. 12 Part V will
discuss class action suits, specifically the split in jurisdictions, as to whether
class action waivers are unconscionable. 13 Finally, Part VI makes public
policy suggestions to protect payday lending consumers and designs a new
mediation system for payday lending disputes. 14
6 See id.
7Id.
8 William M. Welch, Law Caps Interest on "Payday Advances" To Servicemembers,
U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2006-10-17-paydayloansx.htm.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part II.
I ISee infra Part Il.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part VI.
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II. THE PAYDAY LENDING PROCESS AND LOAN FLIPPING
In the early 1990s, the United States contained only 200 payday lending
stores. 15 Between 2000 and 2004, the number of stores more than doubled
from 10,000 to 22,000, and that number is expected to double again in the
next decade. 16 The popularity of the payday lending process means that the
industry loans up to $40 billion every year to people who are not traditionally
credit-worthy. 17 Since the payday loan industry is expected to grow at such a
rapid pace, it is important to understand both how the payday lending process
works and one of its biggest problems-loan flipping.
A. The Payday Lending Process
Payday loans are short term loans for small amounts of money that have
very high interest rates.18 The period of the loan is usually two weeks, which
coincides with the borrower's paycheck. 19 A borrower may also give the
lender a post-dated check, which the lender defers presenting for cashing
until a specified time frame has passed, generally fourteen days.20 Payday
loans are also referred to as "cash advance loans," "post-dated check loans,"
"check advance loans," "deferred deposit checks," or "delayed deposit
checks." 21
In a standard payday transaction, a borrower must present little more
than a driver's license, a checkbook, and proof of steady income in order to
be eligible for a cash advance, but no credit checks are performed.2 2 A
borrower then writes a personal, post-dated check or authorizes a debit from
a personal checking account in exchange for a cash advance. 23 The check or
debit is made for the amount of the loan plus fees, which are usually $33 for
15 Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REv. 855, 861
(2007).
16Id.
17 See id.
18 Tara Shinnick, Annotation, State Regulation of Payday Loans, 29 A.L.R. 6th 461
(2007). For example, a $200 two-week loan with a $30 fee has an annual interest rate of
almost 400%. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 15, at 857.
19 Mann & Hawkins, supra note 15, at 857.
20 Id.
21 Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I, 2(a)(14) (2008).
22 See Deena Reynolds, A Look at Payday Loans and Current Regulation in Texas, 8
TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 321, 323 (2007).
23 Id.
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every $100 borrowed.24 When the loan is made, the lender and the borrower
know that the borrower may not have the money to repay the cash advance
so the parties agree that the post-dated check will not be cashed or the
personal checking account debited until a later date.25 On the agreed upon
date, the borrower will repay the advance, the lender will cash the check, or
the borrower may defer ("flip") the loan.2 6
B. Payday Lending Institutions Depend on Chronic Loan Flippers and
the Cycle of Debt for Profits
Deferring the loan is referred to as "loan flipping" or "rolling over.' 27
Loan flipping allows borrowers to extend their loans by rolling over the first
loan into a new loan.28 In order to flip the loan, a borrower is required to
write out a check for a "flipping fee" plus the cost of the new loan where the
flipping fee is generally much less than the amount owed on the loan.29 For
example, it costs $66 to roll over a $200 loan in Texas.30 The old loan
amount is then rolled into the new loan amount, the flipping fee is added, and
interest is charged on the entire amount of the flipped loan and fees. 31
Borrowers choose to flip loans because payday lending institutions
require consumers to pay the full amount of the loan at the end of the loan
term (a balloon payment) so no incremental payments or payment plans are
allowed.32 Many customers cannot afford to pay back the full extent of the
loan.33 Left with the prospect of rolling over the loan for a minimal fee or
criminal prosecution for writing a bad check, most payday loan borrowers
choose to roll over their loan.34 The roll over process is detrimental to the
borrower because the fees owed increase dramatically every time the loan is
flipped due to triple digit interest rates.35 In fact, the standard payday
borrower pays back $793 for a $325 loan, costing Americans nearly $4.2
24 Id. at 324.
25 12 C.F.R. § 226, Supp. I, 2(a)(14).
26 Id.; see infra Part H.B.
27 Reynolds, supra note 22, at 325.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Reynolds, supra note 22, at 325.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 325-26.
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billion per year in excessive fees.36 Nearly 90% of payday lending revenues
are based on fees stripped from borrowers who have flipped loans and are
trapped in a cycle of debt.37
For example, Lisa Engelkins, a single mother working for $8 an hour, is
a typical case of how easy it is to become trapped in the loan flipping cycle
of debt.38 When finances were tough she went to Urgent Money Service
Store, wrote a post-dated check for $300, and left with $255. 39 She delayed
the hardship of paying the $255 loan back by renewing her loan thirty-five
times.40 Every two weeks for seventeen months, Engelkins paid $45 in fees
on her original loan.41 "As soon as you get your first loan, you are trapped
unless you know you will have the 300 extra dollars in the next two weeks,"
she stated.42 In the end, Engelkins paid over $1,254 in fees for the $255
revolving cash loan.43 She finally escaped the debt trap by withdrawing all
funds from her checking account, allowing all of her checks to bounce, and
dedicating two years to paying off the original $255 loan.44 Engelkins' thirty-
five-week loan roll over is not abnormal-the typical payday borrower will
have an outstanding payment for thirty weeks.45
While the payday loan industry claims that the cash advance is only for
emergencies, statistics show that many people are enticed into a cycle of
indebtedness and reuse of "quick fix" options.46 In fact, the Center for
Responsible Lending found that the one time, two week payday loan
borrower was "virtually non-existent. 47 Numerous studies have also shown
36 Uriah King et al., Financial Quicksand: Payday Lending Sinks Borrowers in Debt
with $4.2 Billion in Predatory Fees Every Year, at 2 (Nov. 2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs.rrO 12-fmancialquicksand- 106.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Center for Responsible Lending, Victims of Payday Lending: Looking for a Way
Out: Lisa Engelkin's Story, http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/tools-
resources/victims-i.html. (last visited May 13, 2009).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 38.
45 Richard J. Thomas, Rolling Over Borrowers: Preventing Excessive Refinancing
and Other Necessary Changes in the Payday Loan Industry, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv.
2401, 2411 (2007).
46 See Reynolds, supra note 22, at 326; Center for Responsible Lending, supra note
38.
47 King et al., supra note 36, at 3 (stating that the report "found that only one percent
of payday loans go to borrowers who take out one loan per year and walk away free and
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that most of the payday loan industry's profits are made on repeat customers,
with more than half of all customers taking out more than six loans a year in
North Carolina48 and the average payday loan customer in Colorado taking
out 9.38 payday loans from the same vendor.49 Clearly, payday lending
establishments depend on consumers who are in need of long-term cash flow
remedies and not temporary high-interest loans. 50
III. USURY LAWS FAIL To PROTECT PAYDAY LENDING CONSUMERS
Many opponents of payday lending argue that the practice of charging
triple digit interest rates on short-term loans is usury and suggest the strict
application of usury laws to payday loan transactions. 51 Other critics of the
payday loan industry hold that a strict application of usury laws is not enough
to ensure that consumers are treated fairly by payday lenders. 52 This section
will explain what usury laws are and why they are not the best solution to
protecting consumers of payday loans.
clear after paying it off... ninety-one percent of payday loans go to borrowers with five
or more loan transactions per year... the data show that payday loans are, in fact,
designed to be renewed.").
48 Mark Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the
Price?, at 4-5, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf paper
session 1_flannery.pdf ("[A] substantial subset of borrowers appear to use the [payday
lending] product chronically.. . Our numbers confirm the prevalence of repeated use by
a subset of customers: we find that fewer than half of a typical store's customers take out
six or fewer loans per year.").
49 Paul Chessin, Borrowing From Peter To Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of
Colorado's Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 387, 410 (2006) (arguing
that "Colorado payday lenders derive the majority of their revenues from, and hence are
economically dependent upon, the 'repeat' borrower."). Chessin also notes that the
average number of times a payday borrow in Colorado takes out a loan may actually be
more than 9.38 times because the data does not account for loans taken out from more
than one payday lender.
50 Reynolds, supra note 22, at 326 ("Continual loan flipping reveals that payday
loans may not be serving a customer's short-term lending needs... The high number of
times a borrower typically rolls over a loan is strong evidence that these loans are not
being used for emergencies but rather for long-term needs.").
51 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2418.
52 Id. at 2402.
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A. Arguments For and Against Strict Usury Laws for Payday Lending
Contracts
Usury is the taking of more for the use of money than the law allows.53
Usury laws protect against the oppression of debtors through excessive rates
of interest charged by lenders.54 There is no federal usury law, so each state
has its own percentage rate that is considered de facto usury. 55 Generally,
four elements are held to be crucial in order to constitute usury:
There must be a loan or forbearance; the loan must be of
money or something circulating as money; it must be repayable
absolutely and at all events; and something must be exacted for the
use of the money in excess of and in addition to the interest
allowed by law.56
Some states require an intent element on behalf of the lender to exact interest
at a rate which is usurious in fact and in law.57 Other courts have determined
that it is unnecessary to show that the lender consciously intended to exact
usury but that this intent will be implied if the loan contract does indeed
demand a usurious rate of return. 5 8
Since usury is set up to disallow high interest loans, some argue that
these laws should be strictly enforced as a means of controlling the payday
lending industry. The federal Military Lending Act is an example of strict
usury requirements used to prevent military personnel from getting trapped
in the payday loan cycle of debt. As required by the Act, certain lending
institutions, including payday lending companies, may not make loans with
53 44B AM. JuR. 2D Interest and Usury § 81 (2007).
54 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2418.
55 See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More than they Can
Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 515, 550 (2007). In California, parties may contract for
interest on a loan primarily for personal, family, or household purposes at a rate not
exceeding 10% per year. CA CONST. art. XV, § 1. In Ohio, "parties to a bond, bill,
promissory note, or other instrument of writing for the forbearance or payment of money
at any future time, may stipulate therein for the payment of interest upon the amount
thereof at any rate not exceeding eight per cent per annum payable annually. . . ." OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (West 1988).
56 9 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 20.4 (4th ed. 1992).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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higher than a 36% interest rate to military personnel or their families.59 This
law takes the position that interest rate caps are an efficient way to control
predatory lending, at least for a certain vulnerable portion of the
population. 60
While strict enforcement of usury laws seems to work on its face, it does
not get to the real scope of the payday lending problem for three reasons.
First, in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, the Supreme Court ruled that
state usury laws do not bind national banks and "there is, in short, no such
thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank. ' 61 This means
that it is impossible to bring a charge of usury against a payday lending
business that charter rents62 from a national bank (as long as the bank
technically makes and retains the risk on the loan).63 Since the case law is
established, one of the only ways usury laws could be efficient in curbing
payday lending is for Congress to pass a federal usury law. Second, payday
lending companies would go out of business because they would be unable to
afford making high risk loans for a profit.64 While this may be the ultimate
goal of some consumer groups, payday lending does provide a valuable
service to members of the community who do not want to go through the
long process of a bank loan or are not credit-worthy enough for traditional
lending options.65 Third, payday loans are fundamentally different from other
types of loans because they are short-term, so an interest rate of 391% could
only amount to $15 on a $100 loan.66 Considering that the average payday
loan customer earns only $25,000 a year or less, $15 extra can be a
59 Press Release, Center for Responsible Lending, Military Lending Act to Take
Effect October 1 (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/FINALMLAtakeeffectPR9-27-07pdf.
60 Id. at 2. ("'The interest rate cap is a good model for states. It's the only thing that
has proven to control predatory payday lending,' said Kathleen Keest, senior policy
counsel for the Center for Responsible Lending.").
61 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 11 (2003).
62 See infra Part III.B.
63 Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the
Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST.
L.J. 653, 708 (2005).
64 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2424.
65 Id. at 2424-25.
66 Id. at 2423.
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substantial amount.67 The real problem, however, lies with the ability of
payday loan borrowers to flip their loans. 68
B. Strict Usury Laws Have Failed to Regulate the Payday Lending
Industry
State attempts to control payday lending businesses through strict usury
laws have been unsuccessful. For example, Virginia attempted to eliminate
payday lending by restricting annual percentage rates to 36% for small
loans.69 This did not work because of a loophole in the National Bank Act
(NBA) where nationally chartered banks can charge the interest rate allowed
in the state the bank is located and not the state the bank makes the loan in.70
Payday loan companies take advantage of this loophole by contracting with
nationally chartered banks so that the bank technically extends credit to the
payday loan borrower.71 This process is known as "charter renting. '72
In 2006, the state of Georgia attempted to close the charter renting
loophole by passing legislation that forbids "in-state payday loan companies
from issuing loans for and acting as an agent for out-of-state banks when the
payday loan companies retain more than half of the proceeds from the
loan."'73 In response, payday loan companies and their out-of-state bank
sponsors filed suit against the attorney general claiming the legislation was
preempted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the dormant Commerce
Clause, and the Federal Arbitration Act.74 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
legislation did not violate any federal law due to the exception for out-of-
state banks.75 It is this exception that allows out-of-state banks to make
67 See id. at 2406.
68 Id. at 2410 (noting that the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency stated that "[o]ne of
the principal features of payday loans that have led to abuses is frequent renewal,
resulting in additional fees to the consumer."); see also supra Part II.B.
69 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2419.
70 Id. at 2418-19.
71 Id. at 2419.
72 1d. at 2418.
73 Id. at 2421. It also caps small consumer loans at Georgia's small loan usury rate
of 60% per year, adds stiff criminal and civil penalties for violators, and bars non-bank
lenders from partnering with banks to avoid Georgia's usury laws. Ellen Hamick,
Georgia's Payday Loan Law: A Model for Preventing Predatory Payday Lending, Center
For Responsible Lending Policy Analysis, 2 (June 2006).
74 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2421; Harnick, supra note 73, at 2.
75 Bankwest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11 th Cir. 2005) (remanded for
mootness). The Eleventh Circuit stated that:
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payday loans on their own behalf that may make legislation fruitless in the
ultimate goal to secure fair payday loan contract terms for consumers. 76
While it remains to be seen exactly how effective Georgia's law is in
curbing triple digit interest rates for payday loans, it could eliminate a
legitimate credit option for many consumers who rely on payday lending.77
Because the payday lending institutions do serve a valid purpose, and
attempts to get rid of the industry all together have proven futile, payday loan
customers must be given more protection. Thus, the current business
practices of payday lending companies, including mandatory arbitration
clauses, must be carefully scrutinized for fairness.
IV. MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE UNCONSCIONABLE
Many payday lending companies require borrowers to sign contracts that
require any dispute between the company and the consumer to be resolved in
mandatory arbitration. 78 While voluntary arbitration is held as a venerable
method of dispute resolution in the United States, mandatory arbitration is
controversial because it is often nonconsensual. 79 Mandatory arbitration
clauses in payday lending contracts should be required to meet the legal
requirements of conscionability so that they are not deemed unconscionable
by the courts. 80
For the following reasons, the Act does not stand as an obstacle to achieving
this objective or substantially impair the right created by the federal law, and,
therefore, there is no conflict preemption. First, and most important, the Act
provides a complete exemption to out-of-state banks for liability under the
Act... Second, the Act does not prohibit out-of-state banks from using independent
agents, including payday stores, or other partnerships to make payday loans at their
home-state interest rates in Georgia... In addition, the Act leaves open other
alternatives for out-of-state banks to export their home-state interest rates to Georgia
borrowers.
Id.
76 See Thomas, supra note 45, at 2421. On the other hand, The Center for
Responsible Lending argues that the Georgia law "is a useful example of how state laws
can proscribe both predatory lending and lender attempts at subterfuge, including those
involving out-of-state or national banks." Hamick, supra note 73, at 4.
77 Thomas, supra note 45, at 2421.
78 See infra Part IV.A.
79 See infra Part IV.A.
80 See infra Part IV.C.
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A. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Payday Lending Contracts. A
Trap for the Unwary Financially Strapped Consumer
Currently, many payday loan companies require their customers to agree
to mandatory arbitration in their loan contract.81 Arbitration is a method of
dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are usually
agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.82
Mandatory arbitration clauses require parties to resolve their legal issue in
arbitration instead of in court. 83
Voluntary arbitration is a favored form of dispute resolution by U.S.
courts and Congress. 84 According to the most recent U.S. Supreme Court
decision, the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 85 in 1925
"declared a national policy favoring arbitration" and took away the power of
the states to require a courtroom trial when the contracting parties agreed to
resolve the dispute through arbitration methods.86 This set the stage for
Supreme Court opinions tolerating mandatory arbitration between individual
and commercial entities. 87
Mandatory arbitration has been criticized as unfair to consumers because
the agreements are nonconsensual, companies slant the odds in their favor,
81 Kelly J. Noyes, Comment, Get Cash Until Payday! The Payday-Loan Problem in
Wisconsin, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 1627, 1672 (2006).
82 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004).
83 Id.
84 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1636.
85 Section two of the Federal Arbitration Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
86 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
87 See Stemlight, supra note 1, at 1636. In the Supreme Court decisions Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) and Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the Court stated that commercial
arbitration is favored. Sternlight argues that these decisions surprised corporations
because it allowed them to use arbitration in situations previously not thought possible
for public policy reasons. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1636. As a result, many
corporations instituted contracts requiring customers to agree to resolve all future
disputes through arbitration. See id.
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and consumers may be denied substantive relief.88 Mandatory arbitration
agreements are argued to be nonconsensual because most consumers do not
read or understand the contract they are signing and therefore do not realize
they are signing away their right to a courtroom trial. 89 This is especially true
for payday loan customers since many are desperate for cash and not highly
educated.90
Many critics of mandatory arbitration also assert that companies try to
slant the arbitration in a way that favors them and not the consumer by using
such tactics as high costs, company selection of arbitrator, and remedy
limitations. 91 Additionally, companies that write their own mandatory
arbitration clauses may bar substantive relief that the consumer would be
entitled to under a court process, such as attorney fees, compensatory
damages, punitive damages, or even the ability to appeal. 92 The negative
consequences of arbitration are so numerous that lawyers in South Carolina
have been advised to list the ways arbitration differs from litigation in
retainer agreements if they are contemplating mandating arbitration for
malpractice suits. 93
Mandatory arbitration has also been criticized because it allows issues of
public interest to be tried in secrecy.94 Arbitration proceedings and
8 8 Id. at 1649-53.
8 9 Id. at 1649.
90 Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REv. 1, 101 (2002).
91 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1649-50.
92 Id. at 1652-53. Sternlight notes that many courts have stricken down mandatory
arbitration clauses trying to deny consumers substantive relief. However, attacks on these
clauses are costly to litigate and lawyers who work on a contingent fee may be reluctant
to take these cases. Id. at 1653.
93 John Freeman, Ethics Watch: The New Rules and You, 17 S.C. LAW. 9, 9 (Mar.
2006). Freeman notes that:
Among the arguably negative consequences of arbitration are that the client
will lose his or her right to: a jury trial, a presiding judge bound by the Code of
Judicial Conduct, full discovery proceedings, certain evidentiary rules or a right to
findings based on the evidence with explicit legal reasoning. Additionally, the client
should be told that his or her ability to appeal adverse decisions will be curtailed,
and costs of the proceeding may be higher than in a court case.
Id.
94 Stephanie Brenowitz, Note, Deadly Secrecy: The Erosion of Public Information
Under Private Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 679, 680 (2004) (arguing that the
switch from public litigation to private justice alternative dispute methods such as
arbitration keeps important issues of public interest a secret).
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settlements are confidential. 95 While confidentiality may be legitimate in
circumstances of trade secrets, issues of consumer interest should be public
so that industry-wide patterns of abuse can be exposed and businesses are
forced to openly admit wrong-doing. 96 Additionally, arbitrators themselves
lack public accountability in procedure and in written works, whereas the
judiciary's work is open and published. 97 This means that the public never
gets a chance to discuss perceived injustices and demand legislative action-
a vital part of the democratic process. 98 Since the payday lending industry
charges triple digit interest rates and profits on chronic borrowers, its use of
mandatory arbitration clauses is a good candidate for public dispute and
industry-wide admittance of wrong-doing.
B. Unconscionability: A Murky Legal Subject
Arbitration clauses can be struck down by courts through the common
law standard of unconscionability. 99 Common law contract defenses to
mandatory arbitration clauses are allowed because the FAA specifically
states that arbitration clauses may be invalidated based "upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 100 Generally,
unconscionability "is determined by reference to the relative benefit of the
bargain to the parties at the time of its making, the nature of the methods
employed in negotiating it, and the relative bargaining power of the
parties."' 0 '
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) does not define
unconscionability in the text of the statute, 10 2 but it does clarify the concept
95 Id. at 689, 694.
96 Id. at 690 ("Hiding the outcome of meritorious dispute can shield the losing party
from any implication that it has done something wrong, which can have greater
consequences down the line.").
97 Id. at 701 ("In the litigation context, judges are known entities to the public. Their
work is published, their professional histories can be traced, and their actions are
ultimately subject to the inspection of the press and the public.").
98 See id. at 684-85. ("The purpose of an open judicial system is to safeguard justice
by opening its processes to the light of day, to make sure that parties are treated fairly.
Yet another equally important function is to reveal the content of litigation to the press
and the public.").
99 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1643.
100 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
101 U.S. v. Bedford Assoc., 657 F.2d 1300, 1313 (2d Cir. 1981).
102 UCC § 2-302 (1) and (2) state:
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in its Official Comment. Under the Official Comment, the test of
unconscionability is whether the contract clause is so one-sided it is
unconscionable based on all the surrounding circumstances at the time the
contract was made.10 3 The main standard of unconscionability is "the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise, and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."' 0 4 Because of this
standard, unconscionability is often found in contracts between sophisticated
businesses and unsophisticated consumers. 105 The approach of the UCC and
most states regarding the determination of whether a contract is
unconscionable, however, is ad hoc, and the only standardized rules
regarding its determination are the ideas of procedural and substantive
unconscionability.1 06
In order for a contract to be unconscionable in most states, it must be
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 10 7  Procedural
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Id.
103 UCC § 2-302, Comment 1 states:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract ... The
principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise, and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power.
Id.
104 Id.
105 See 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 1992). This
assertion comes from numerous federal cases listed in the Williston text. The Supreme
Court has not dealt with the theory of unconscionability or set standards regarding its
determination. Additionally, each state has different demands for procedural and
substantive unconscionability. Due to these factors, Williston on Contracts is the most
developed resource on the subject of unconscionability.
106 Id. at§ 18:11.
10 7 Id. In the Sixth Circuit, the test of unconscionability is two pronged and inquires:
"(1) What is the relative bargaining power of the parties, their relative economic strength,
[Vol. 24:2 2009]
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN PAYDAY LENDING LOANS
unconscionability is usually classified as surprise or inability to negotiate the
terms of the contract with comprehension. 108 Substantive unconscionability
is usually described as unfair or unreasonable contract terms. 109 Some
disparity in bargaining power is allowed by courts, but "gross inequality of
bargaining power, together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger
party, may confirm.., that the transaction involved elements of deception or
compulsion, or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice,
no real alternative, or did not in fact assent ... to the unfair terms.' 10 Many
courts first decide if both forms of unconscionability are present and then
balance the two to determine the result of the case. I 1
Since the test of unconscionability is so amorphous and fact-specific,
judges are often loathe to invalidate contracts supposedly containing the
intent of both parties, 1 2 and lawyers therefore find it difficult to weigh their
client's chance of winning the case. 113 This uncertainty will impede low
the alternative sources of supply, in a word, what are their options?; (2) Is the challenged
term substantively reasonable?" Anderson Inc. v. Horton Farms Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 322
(6th Cir. 1998). In the Ninth Circuit, procedural unconscionability:
is manifested by (1) "oppression," which refers to an inequality of bargaining power
resulting in no meaningful choice for the weaker party, or (2) 'surprise,' which
occurs when the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a document.
Substantive unconscionability is an overly harsh allocation of risks or costs which is
not justified by the circumstances under which the contract was made. Both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present before a contract or
clause will be held unenforceable.
Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, (9th Cir. 2001).
108 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 105, at § 18: 10.
109 "Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably
or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent." Harris
v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). Since the UCC does not
explicitly mention procedural unconscionability, some states have decided that
substantive unconscionability is the only standard of unconscionability that cases should
be decided upon. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 105, at § 18:10.
110 Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 169 n.2 (Wis.
2006). In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a one-sided arbitration
provision in an auto loan contract, which required indigent borrowers to arbitrate all
claims while the lender remained free to enforce its rights in court, was unconscionable.
l 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 105, at § 18.10.
112 See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 277 (2000). ("[I]n the absence of any mistake,
fraud, or oppression, the courts, as such, are not interested in the wisdom of contracts and
agreements voluntarily entered into between competent parties.").
113 See Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1653 (arguing that "when attorneys make a
determination as to whether to represent a particular client, particularly on a contingent
fee basis, they take into account the extent of the client's likely recovery, if successful.").
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income clients, the vast majority of payday loan borrowers, from retaining
quality legal representation on a contingency fee."l 4
C. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Payday Lending Contracts are
Unconscionable
Mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending contracts are
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. They are procedurally
unconscionable based on surprise and real incapability of payday lending
consumers to comprehend the terms of contract. They exhibit both lack of
meaningful choice for one party and contractual terms that are unreasonably
favorable to another party. Moreover, there have been charges of oral
misrepresentation of the contract by payday loan workers to borrowers."l 5
The arbitration clauses are substantively unconscionable because they are
contractually unreasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances and
because of gross power disparities between the average payday lending
customer and the payday lender. For instance, most payday borrowers do not
have a legal sense of contracts and are desperate for money-they do not
know that they are signing away the right to a trial, do not understand what
arbitration means, and do not have the option of bargaining for a different
contract. 116 Further, most payday lending businesses are placed in
114 See id.
115 See Michael Bertics, Note, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater
Bank Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 139-49 (2005) (noting that surveys in
Ohio show that many payday lending businesses will not allow consumers to take
contracts home to read them, provide false information to customers about the terms of
loan, and only disclose interest rates at the very end of the transaction, among other
highly evasive lending techniques).
116 See Wisconsin Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d at 178-79 (Wis.
2006) (Butler, J., concurring). Justice Butler argued against mandatory arbitration clauses
in short-term auto loan contracts by stating:
[C]harging 300 percent interest for a short-term loan to those who
can ill-afford it is ridiculous, unreasonable, and unconscionable ....
Predatory lenders exploit borrowers through excessively high interest
rates. Consumers who must borrow money this way are usually in
desperate debt. These lenders target low-income consumers, individuals
with stained credit scores, and those in society who cannot access
traditional sources of money and credit. The high rates that predatory
lenders charge make it difficult for borrowers to repay the loan, resulting
in many consumers being driven onto a perpetual debt treadmill.
Essentially, the predatory lender sets the borrower up to fail.
Id.
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impoverished areas, have a clientele that are not highly educated, and charge
rates higher than loan sharks. 117 Based on the UCC's definition of
unconscionability, mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending contracts
are unconscionable because the clauses are one-sided in favor of the payday
lending companies under the circumstances existing at the time of making
the contract.
Opponents of the unconscionability defense argue the doctrine is too
vague to be helpful and should be disposed of by courts. 118 However,
because the historical and philosophical function of the unconscionability
doctrine is to protect societal values such as fairness, 119 it is ideal for
challenging unfair mandatory arbitration clauses in payday loan contracts.
Since unconscionability has been codified in the UCC § 2-302, which was
accepted by every state except Louisiana, there is little chance the formalists
will convince states and courts to discard the unconscionability doctrine in
the near future. 120 Therefore, resting contemporary social problems such as
payday lending on the legal argument of unconscionability is legitimate. This
legitimate claim, however, is muddied by the separability doctrine and split
federal jurisdictions.
D. The Doctrine of Separability and Split Courts: Impeding Future
Unconscionability Claims for Payday Lending Consumers
1. The Doctrine of Separability
Federal jurisdictions have split over whether it is the job of the court or
the arbitrator to decide whether mandatory arbitration clauses are
unconscionable. In 1961, the Supreme Court introduced the "separability
117 See Thomas, supra note 45, at 2406-07; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1561 (8th ed. 2004) (defining unconscionable as "(Of an act or transaction) showing no
regard for conscience; affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.").
118 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58
ALA. L. REv. 73, 73 (2006) (noting the "popular formalist critiques of unconscionability
that urge for the doctrine's demise or constraint based on claims that its flexibility and
lack of clear definition threaten efficiency in contract law.").
119 Id. ("[U]nconscionability is necessarily flexible and contextual in order to serve
its historical and philosophical function of protecting core human values.
Unconscionability is not frivolous gloss on classical contract law. Instead, it provides a
flexible safety net for catching contractual unfairness that slips by formulaic contract
defenses.").
120 Id. at 89-90. ("Unconscionability should therefore survive modem formalism's
fight against flexible contract standards, and embrace its flexibility in order to serve as a
safety net for protecting societal fairness norms.").
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doctrine" for mandatory arbitration in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., essentially stating that mandatory arbitration clauses can be
separated out from the contract as a whole. 121 Prima Paint stated that the
FAA requires that claims of fraud in the inducement of an agreement to
arbitrate be heard by the court, but fraud in the inducement of an entire
contract must go to an arbitrator. 122 Therefore, unless the arbitration clause
itself is induced by a limited number of defenses, such as fraud or duress, the
court must uphold the arbitration clause in the contract. 123 Accordingly,
mandatory arbitration clauses cannot be challenged based on the
unconscionability of the contract as a whole. 124
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the separability doctrine of Prima Paint and extended the doctrine
to state courts in a case of alleged usurious loans by a check cashing
business. 125 Buckeye Check Cashing is an important decision for payday
loan cases because it demonstrates the Court's unwillingness to change the
terms of contracts. It also reveals that the Supreme Court may be prepared to
uphold payday lending contracts that contain possibly unconscionable
mandatory arbitration clauses unless the plaintiff charges that the arbitration
clause itself is unconscionable based on the FAA. 126
121 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1961).
In Prima Paint, Flood & Conklin brought an action to rescind a contract on the grounds
that it had been fraudulently induced. Prima Paint argued that an arbitrator, and not the
Court, should decide if the contract was valid due to its mandatory arbitration clause. The
Supreme Court agreed with Prima Paint and concluded that because Flood & Conklin
was challenging the whole contract and not just the arbitration clause, the claim of
inducement was for the arbitrator to decide.
122 Id.
123 Joseph L. Franco, Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A
Re-Evaluation of First Options in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 443, 446 n.13 (2006).
124 See id. at 453. ("Applying the language of [FAA] section 4, the Court reasoned
that a party seeking to avoid arbitration has not placed the agreement to arbitrate in issue
if the party attacks the contract generally rather than the arbitration agreement in
particular. As a result, if a party has entered into an agreement containing an arbitration
clause and wishes to avoid arbitration, that party will not succeed merely by attacking the
validity of the contract generally.").
125 Buckeye Check Cashing Inc v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-49 (2006). In
Buckeye Check Cashing, Cardegna took out numerous "loans" from Buckeye by getting
cash in exchange for a personal check and a finance charge. Each time Cardegna made an
exchange, he signed an agreement with a mandatory arbitration clause. Cardegna alleged
Buckeye charged usurious interest rates and violated consumer protection laws. Buckeye
demanded that the case go to mandatory arbitration and the Supreme Court agreed. Id.
126 See Franco, supra note 123, at 453.
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In reality, the cost, time, and effort of litigating cases based solely on the
unconscionability of a mandatory arbitration clause may make this option
nearly impossible for many payday lending consumers. 127 This means that
most unconscionable mandatory arbitration clauses will never be brought to
court because neither attorneys nor their clients have the resources or the
willingness to go through the lengthy and uncertain process of trying such
cases. 128 Since alternative dispute resolution offers lower cost and higher
flexibility methods than formal litigation, it is a more realistic option for low-
income payday lending borrowers. Mandatory arbitration, however, is not the
best answer.1 29
2. Federal and State Jurisdictions are Split over Unconscionability
of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
Another hurdle for payday loan borrowers contesting their contracts is
that federal and state courts are split over whether mandatory arbitration
clauses are unconscionable. In Jenkins v. First American Cash Advance of
Georgia, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit found that the unconscionability of
mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending contracts is for the arbitrator
to decide. 130 On the other hand, in Alabama Catalog Sales v. Harris, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that the trial court, rather than an arbitrator, is
to decide whether contracts containing arbitration clauses are void and
unenforceable. 131
Alabama Catalog Sales is an important case to payday lending because it
adheres to a narrow reading of Prima Paint instead of the broad reading that
127 Sternlight, supra note 1, at 1655-56.
128 See id. at 1656.
129 See supra Part IV.B; see also infra Part VI.B.
130 Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 876-77 (1 1th
Cir. 2005). In Jenkins, the plaintiff signed mandatory arbitration contracts each time she
took out a payday loan. Jenkins charged First American with usurious rates and First
American moved to compel arbitration. The appellate court's decision to leave the issue
of unconscionability to the arbitrator reversed the district court's holding that the
mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending contracts were unconscionable.
131 Ala. Catalog Sales v. Harris, 794 So. 2d 312, 317 (Ala. 2000). In this case, Harris
charged Alabama Catalog Sales with violating the Alabama Small Loan Act by making
illegal payday loans, charging usurious interest rates, and collecting on the loans without
a license from the Bureau of Loans of the State of Alabama. Harris also argued that her
contracts with Alabama Catalog Sales were void because of illegality so the arbitration
agreements in the contracts were void. Alabama Catalog Sales argued that the arbitration
agreements were valid and should be enforced. The court held that the trial court, and not
an arbitrator, must decide if the contract is legal and enforceable.
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many other jurisdictions follow. The court states that Prima Paint does not
apply to this case because it centers on whether a contract really exists and
not an attempt to completely rescind an acknowledged contract. 132 "[A] party
who contests the making of a contract containing an arbitration provision
cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate. Only a court can make that decision. 1 33 The narrow
reading of Prima Paint used in this case could be an escape from the
separability doctrine's suppression of unconscionability arguments for
payday lending contracts.
V. CLASS ACTION SUITS SHOULD NOT BE DENIED TO PAYDAY LOAN
CONSUMERS
Class action suits are one of the most viable ways for payday lending
consumers to get the resources to have their cases tried. 134 Jurisdictions have
split over whether class action waivers are unconscionable in contracts. 135
Many payday loan contracts contain a class action suit waiver just as they
contain a mandatory arbitration clause. 136 In order to properly protect
consumers, class action waivers should be declared unconscionable or simply
unlawful. 137
A. What Is A Class Action Suit and What Is A Class Action Waiver?
A class action suit is a lawsuit where the court authorizes a single person
or small group to represent the interests of a larger group. 138 There are
generally four prerequisites to a class action suit according to Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 139 Those prerequisites are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
132 Id. at 314 n.2.
133 Id. (quoting Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Crisp, 646 So. 2d 613, 616-17 (Ala.
1994) (emphasis original)).
134 See infra Part V.A.
135 See infra Part V.B.
136 See infra Part V.B.
137 See infra Part V.B.
13 8 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (8th ed. 2004).
139 Id.
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the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. 
140
If all of these prerequisites are met, the suit must meet one requirement of
23(b) in order to be maintained. 141
Class action suits are advantageous because they permit plaintiffs access
to the courts by allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to pool their resources and
combine their claims in instances where no one plaintiff has endured
substantial enough injury to support the underlying claim. 142 Class action
suits are also appropriate for payday loan consumers because they are a way
to enforce the rights of the poor. 143 Most class action suits are taken on a
contingency fee basis where the attorney does not get paid unless the class
collects a recovery. 144 Since attorneys are willing to take them on a
140 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
141 Id. at 23(b). Rule 23(b) provides that:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: (1)
prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a
risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members
that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; (2) the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the
class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.
142 Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit: An Examination of the
Implicit Advantages and a Response to Common Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 755, 788 (2008).
143 Id. at 789 (stating 'When the plaintiff is poor, marginalized, legally
incompetent, ignorant of legal rights, or unable to assert rights for fear of sanctions or
otherwise, and these disabilities are shared by others similarly situated, the class action
may be the only effective means to obtain judicial relief."') (quoting Lynn Pierce, Trend
and Development: Raising the Roof on Community Housing for People with Disabilities:
Class Actions in Canada, 6 APPEAL 22 (2000)).
144 Melnick, supra note 142, at 789-90.
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contingent basis, class action suits are a realistic way for indigent parties to
obtain quality legal representation. 45
Many large businesses, including the payday loan industry, oppose class
action suits because they are a way of regulating corporations that make it
cost-prohibitive to litigate small claims.' 46 Without class action suits, many
businesses are able to commit wrongdoings without answering to
consumers.147 To protect themselves against the damage of class action suits,
many industries have placed class action waivers in contracts of adhesion.148
These class action waivers require consumers to relinquish their rights to
class action remedies upon agreement to the contract. 149
B. Although Jurisdictions Are Split, Contractual Class Action Waivers
Are Unconscionable
1. Jurisdictions Split over Whether Class Action Waivers in
Contracts are Unconscionable
Jurisdictions have split over whether class action waivers in consumer
contracts are unconscionable. 150 The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,151 and Eleventh Circuits have all held that class
145 See id.
146 See id. at 790.
147 Id. at 791 ("[W]ithout the class action device, many businesses would arguably
be able to escape answering for their wrong-doings until they injured someone so
substantially that it became cost effective for the injured victim to pursue the claim
individually.").
148 See Nivine K. Zakhari, Is The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 A Misnomer?
The Impact on Class Action Waivers in Consumer ADR Clauses, 5 J. AM. ARB. 97, 107
(2006).
149 Id. at 97.
150 See Alan S. Kaplinsky, A Scorecard on Where Federal and State Appellate
Courts and Statutes Stand on Enforcing Class Action Waivers in Pre-Dispute Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 1591 PLL/CORP 9, 13-17 (2007).
151 The Ninth Circuit has contradictory opinions, and it is not clear that the earlier
decisions have been overruled. For example, in Horenstein v. Mortgage Market, Inc., 9
Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2001), the court held that the appellant's contention that the
arbitration clause in the employment agreements may not be enforced because it
eliminates their statutory right to a collective action suit under the Fair Labor Standards
Act is sufficient to render an arbitration clause unenforceable. However, in Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that class
action waivers are unconscionable.
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action waivers in contracts are not unconscionable. 152 For example, in
Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, the Fourth Circuit ruled that an
arbitration clause was not unconscionable merely because it contained a
provision excluding arbitration of disputes on class action basis.153 Snowden,
who partook in twelve deferred-deposit transactions over the course of nine
months, brought an alleged class action against Checkpoint, a check cashing
lender, asserting violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TLA), the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and the
Maryland Consumer Protection Act.154 The court rejected Snowden's claim
that she could not retain legal services without class action standing due to
the small amount of damages in her case because both TILA and RICO
provide for the recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing plaintiff.155
Additionally, the court did not believe that class action waivers were against
a public policy of consumer protection.' 56
On the other hand, courts in the First and the Ninth Circuits have
invalidated class action waivers 157 and numerous state courts have held that
the denial of class action rights in contracts is unconscionable. 158 In Ting v.
AT&T, AT&T used new customer service agreements to limit its customers'
legal rights and remedies to counteract its mandatory detariffing
obligations. 159 Under the detariffing, telephone companies had to establish
152 Kaplinsky, supra note 150, at 13-16.
153 Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002).
154 Id. at 634-35.
155 Id. at 638.
156 Id. at 639 ("Snowden has presented no authority or evidence establishing that the
arbitral forum contemplated by the FAA and provided in the Arbitration Agreement is
inconsistent with public policy relating to consumer protection. Indeed, we have
recognized the arbitral forum specified by the Arbitration Agreement as one provided by
a reputable arbitration organization . . . We also note that the Arbitration Agreement
places no limitations upon the substantive remedies available to Snowden in arbitration.
In sum, we can discern no violation of public policy relating to consumer protection by
requiring Snowden to resolve her claims against Elite in the arbitral forum.").
157 Kaplinsky, supra note 150, at 17.
158 Cooper v. QC Financial Services, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Ariz. 2007).
The court in Cooper v. QC Financial Services, Inc. held that under Arizona law, the
waiver of the right to a class action and class arbitration was substantively
unconscionable in an agreement for payday loans, even though the arbitration provision
containing the waiver was binding on the lender and it was responsible for arbitration
fees. In Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 189 N.J. 1 (2006), the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that an arbitration provision which forbids class-wide
arbitration was unconscionable due to the public interest in class actions as a means to
seeking redress for harms.
159 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
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individual contracts with customers defining rates and terms instead of filing
their rates with the Federal Communications Committee, which gave
consumers contract rights. 160 One method AT&T used to deny its customers
legal remedy was to mandate binding arbitration and ban all class action
suits. 161 The Ninth Circuit followed a lower court in holding that the class
action waiver was manifestly one-sided and therefore substantively
unconscionable. 62
2. Contract Class Action Waivers Are Unconscionable
Denying class actions suits should be prohibited as a matter of fairness
and justice because they prevent the law from being properly enforced.163
Class action waivers are also substantively unconscionable because they are
so one-sided as to "shock the conscience"'164  and procedurally
unconscionable because of unfair surprise and oppression to the consumer. If
banning class action suits in contracts of adhesion is unconscionable, there
may be a reasonable parallel argument that denying a single person their
right to litigate is unconscionable if they choose to forego the class action
route. 165 One problem with this argument is that it could be contended that
the unconscionability of barring class action suits has less to do with the
prohibition itself and more to do with the fact that class action suits are the
160Id. at 1132.
161 Id. at 1133 n.3 ("Section 7, captioned 'Dispute Resolution,' sets forth procedures
for resolving customer disputes. In approximately eight-point font (replicated below),
section 7(a) provides in part: This section provides for resolution of disputes through
final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or
jury or through a class action. You continue to have certain rights to obtain relief from a
federal or state regulatory agency .... No dispute may be joined with another lawsuit, or
in an arbitration with a dispute of any other person, or resolved on a class wide basis. The
arbitrator may not award damages that are not expressly authorized by this agreement and
may not award punitive damages or attorneys' fees unless such damages are expressly
authorized by a statute. You and AT&T both waive any claims for an award of damages
that are excluded under this agreement.").
162 Id. at 1150.
163 Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate
Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 103 (2004).
164 M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 315
(Wash. 2000) ("Timberline's consequential damages clause, when examined at the time
the contract was formed, does not shock the conscience ... it is not substantively
unconscionable.").
165 See generally Stemlight & Jenson, supra note 163, at 79.
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most likely way payday consumers can win their case and receive
remedies. 166
While it might be currently unlikely that individual claims against
mandatory arbitration clauses will be brought, court decisions against
mandatory arbitration clauses could open the door for individual litigants.
Attorneys would have a better idea of the standards needed to prove
individual unconscionability and the likelihood of their client's success.
Additionally, non-profit legal aid and pro bono attorneys are interested in
taking payday loan cases. 167 The concern of these attorneys over payday loan
industry abuse means that there is a greater likelihood the cases will be
brought to court and that the low income status of payday loan customers
will not make an argument for the unconscionability of mandatory arbitration
clauses in individual contracts moot.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE AND A NEW WAY TO
RESOLVE PAYDAY LENDING DISPUTES
A. Public Policy Mandates Federal Payday Loan Industry Regulation
The general response of the federal government has been to mandate that
lending businesses provide consumers with more information about the
nature of the loan in order to make knowledgeable credit decisions. 168 This
sort of free-market response assumes that consumers will use the information
to act rationally and that "bad actors" are pushed out of the economy.169
While a hands-off approach is good in theory, the free-market method does
not take into account the dire straights most payday lending consumers find
themselves in when they walk through the doors. 170 Many payday lending
customers are optimistic about their ability to pay back the loan in two weeks
166 ld at 85-88.
167 See Paul Gores, Legislators to Take Another Crack at a Payday-Loan Law; They
Want Bill That Would Set Limits and Please Governor, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
(Wisconsin), Aug. 19, 2005, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, <ALLNWS> File
(showing that legal aid attorneys have taken an active role in studying and litigating
payday loan cases).
168 Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending:
Enhanced Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to Education,
60 CONsuMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 460, 466 (2006).
169 Id.
170 Charles A. Bruch, Note, Taking the Pay out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to
the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CiN.
L. REv. 1257, 1271 (2001) (noting a payday lender as describing his customers to be
"desperate persons in dire need.").
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and are equally optimistic about never needing the right to sue the payday
lending company. 171 Anti-protectionist public policy theories are admirable
in their insistence on treating consumers as competent adults who are capable
of making their own decisions. 172 In the case of mandatory arbitration
clauses in payday loan contracts, however, public policy dictates a consumer
protectionist response.1 73
The proper public policy is to give consumers a real choice as to whether
to choose arbitration over courtroom litigation. Payday loan company
employees should be mandated to offer government written information
pamphlets on the pros and cons of mandatory arbitration versus court. Once
consumers sign that they have read the pamphlet, they can decide to sign a
contract that has a mandatory arbitration clause or one that does not. Perhaps
the contract with a mandatory arbitration clause can be less expensive
compared to the contract allowing court proceedings, since many companies
believe arbitration saves them money, which is then passed onto the
consumer. 174 This method would not only allow mandatory arbitration
clauses to save some people money but it would also allow less federal or
state regulation of private business practices. Procedural unconscionability
would also be taken away because consumers would have real bargaining
power and choice in contracts.
Due to FAA preemption and federal court splits, comprehensive action
by the federal government is also necessary to protect consumers from
signing away their rights to a trial. Congress should pass laws limiting the
171 See Burlingame, supra note 168, at 480. (stating that "Research has shown that
because people use simplifying tools in decision-making, they: (1) display
overconfidence in their ability to control future events; (2) disregard non-salient low-
level probabilities of harm; and (3) discount risks whose occurrence is some time away,
i.e., discounting the future phenomena, thus explaining why people have a difficult time
saving for the future.").
172 See Philip P. Houle, Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regulation:
Economic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 51, 103 (1989) ("In short, the
free market does not require that an elite run things indefinitely until the rest of us are
sufficiently enlightened to assume full adult responsibilities and rights. That patronizing
view of humanity . . . manifested itself in two important ways that are hallmarks of
totalitarian systems: first, the belief held by many that the state must coerce individuals
into deciding to share their wealth with others, and second, the belief held by certain
groups that they were anointed with the power to direct life until humanity eventually
becomes better able to safely share that power.").
173 See generally Noyes, supra note 81, at 1678-80.
174 Cf Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 163, at 93 (arguing that categorically banning
class action suits save consumers money because making arbitration more favorable to
consumers increases arbitration costs).
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number of times a loan can be deferred at payday loan companies., 75 These
provisions get to the heart of substantive unconscionability in a way that
mandatory arbitration clauses cannot because the big problem of substantive
unconscionability lies in a consumer's ability to "roll-over" loans. 176 Federal
law should prohibit mandatory arbitration contract provisions for payday
loan disputes that do not follow the cap on roll-over limitations. 177
The government could also give payday lending businesses a chance to
institute industry-wide, self-regulated changes to lending practices in lieu of
government overhaul. 178 This would include pressure to ban mandatory
arbitration clauses. While it may be unlikely, the public outcry over the
unfairness of the payday loan industry could put the industry as a whole in
danger, which would be bad for the profits of the banks that sponsor payday
loan companies. 179 In the face of being closed down entirely by
governmental action, major corporations providing payday lending services
may be persuaded into a self-instituted industry-wide clean-up.
B. An "Alternative" Alternative Dispute Resolution Process
As it is designed now, mandatory arbitration is unjust for disputing
payday lending contracts. 180 Court dockets, however, are full and trials are
long and expensive' 81 so the U.S. litigation system is not an efficient or
175 Cf Thomas, supra note 45, at 2430-31.
176 Id.
177 See id. at 2431.
178 The idea of a self-regulated industry is not novel. The accounting industry is
mostly self-regulated and while the Securities and Exchange Commission has the
statutory ability to set accounting standards, it relies on the private industry to create
accounting and recording standards, such as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). See David F. Birke, Note, The Toothless Watchdog: Corporate Fraud and the
Independent Audit - How Can the Public's Confidence Be Restored?, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 891,898-99 (2004).
179 Cf id. at 912 (noting that upon "the collapse of Enron and other corporate giants,
Congress was forced to address public demands for greater protection from unscrupulous
corporate managers.").
180 See supra Part IV.A; Stemlight, supra note 1, at 1674-75 ("The bottom line:
Mandatory private arbitration as we know it today in the United States is indeed unjust,
both because it is imposed by a single private party and because it is private.").
181 Peter Lantka, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Magistrate Judge's Office: A Glimmering Light Amidst the Haze of Federal Litigation,
36 UWLA L. REv. 71, 73 (2005).
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reasonable option in most cases. 182 Since the above public policy protections
will most likely never be instilled because the government is generally not
protectionist, 183 a different sort of alternative dispute resolution must be
considered-one that levels the playing field between payday loan borrowers
and payday loan companies but is still cheap and efficient. Instead of
mandatory arbitration, payday lending contract disputes should use court-
sponsored facilitative mediation with a focus on procedural justice.
1. What is Court-Sponsored Mediation and How Should it be
Used for Payday Lending Disputes?
Mediation entails two aggrieved parties who meet with a neutral third
party (the mediator) to resolve their dispute. 184 If the parties come to an
agreement, they may choose to make the resolution binding. 185 Mediation is
faster and cheaper than arbitration,' 86 which is necessary for many low-
income or indigent payday loan customers. Parties are offered more control
182 Stemlight, supra note 1, at 1675 ("[I]n rejecting mandatory private arbitration we
must not endorse our current mode of public litigation as the only just form of dispute
resolution. Rather, we must continue to search for an array of dispute resolution
processes that, together, will best help us achieve justice.").
183 David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and
Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 148 (1999)
(arguing that "employee advocates perpetuate a myth of government protection when it
does not exist.").
184 Around the States, Mediation Seen as Highly Effective ADR Process, 10 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 31, 31 (1999) ("[T]he National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASDR) is moving toward mediation as a fairer and cheaper route to dispute
resolution .... The NASDR no longer believes that arbitration is quicker, easier, and
cheaper than going to court. According to the NASD, arbitration cases can take several
years to settle and hearings can take as long as 20 days in complex cases .... Arbitration
also can be expensive because the arbitrators' fees are based on the size of the claim. As a
result of the increasing inefficiency of arbitration, the NASD is recommending mediation
as a new alternative to resolving disputes.").
185 David Grappo, Questions Litigators Ask About Mediation, 55 Disp. RESOL. J. 2,
32-34 (2000).
186 Id. ("It is faster because it can be set at the convenience of the parties without
waiting in the court system queues. It is cheaper because the parties avoid the
cumbersome court forms and procedures which are intended to protect their right to a
'fair fight' before an impartial judge.").
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in mediation than they are in other forms of negotiation or litigation and this
makes parties feel empowered to reach a resolution. 187
Court-sponsored mediation has many forms. It can be mandatory where
courts are required to send certain cases to mediation or voluntary where the
parties agree among themselves to mediate.' 88 Additionally, court-sponsored
mediation can simply refer parties to private mediation services, which could
be expensive, or provide well trained volunteer mediators.189 The kind of
court-sponsored mediation that is ideal for payday lending disputes is a
voluntary system where the court provides low-cost or free mediation
services. This system is ideal because parties may be more likely to abide by
the solution reached at the end of the mediation if it is voluntary and minimal
cost or free services make mediation accessible to low income payday loan
consumers.
In most court-sponsored mediation, attorneys are present to negotiate for
the client. 190 Naturally, clients unfamiliar with legal issues give great
credence to their lawyer's opinion regarding the process and solution of the
mediation. 19 1 Payday lending clients should have a choice of representing
themselves or retaining a legal aid attorney and the court should offer free or
low-cost mediation staffed with well-trained pro bono attorneys and
volunteer mediators. 192 The payday loan company should send a local office
manager to the mediation and not a corporate attorney who could unjustly
steer the mediation process. The two parties should agree on a mediator. This
is important because the contract disputant will have a real choice in who
acts as the neutral, which is different than mandatory arbitration where the
187 Catherine Zwetkoff, Mediation in Environmental Conflicts: The Belgian
Methodology, 9 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T 361, 373 (1998).
188 See Dina R. Jansenson, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 481 PLI/LIT 683, 698 (1993).
189 See Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-SponsoredADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 241,272 (2006).
190 Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have Their
Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes Toward Mediation
Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 277, 282 (2007).
191 See id. at 285.
192 See Brazil, supra note 189, at 243 ("[O]ne of the very few ways a court can be
useful to a substantial segment of the population is to offer a free or low-cost ADR
program. By offering such a program, a court acknowledges the real-world limitations,
for many people, of the services it traditionally has offered. As important, the court
demonstrates that it understands that its mission is to offer useable and respect-worthy
service to as large a percentage of the people who have judicially cognizable disputes as
possible. This kind of acknowledgment and demonstration earn a court the gratitude and
respect of the people-and gratitude toward and respect for our public institutions is
essential to the long-range health of our polity.").
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payday lender has contracted the power of choice. 193 Once a settlement has
been reached, the parties should evaluate the mediator to make sure that
court-sponsored mediators are unbiased and well-performing. 194 If the parties
do not reach a settlement, the case should be referred to the American
Arbitration Association (AAA). The AAA will assist the parties in binding
arbitration through its Consumer Due Process Protocol.1 95 The AAA does
have fees for its services but those can be waived if the consumer's annual
gross income falls below 200% of the federal poverty guideline. 196 If the
consumer is not below 200% of the poverty guideline but can still not afford
the service, a pro bono or reduced rate arbitrator can be appointed to the
case. 197
The payday lending industry should agree to replace mandatory
arbitration clauses with voluntary court-sponsored mediation clauses in their
contracts because it will be economically beneficial for their businesses.
98
193 See Hossam M. Fahmy, Arbitration: Wiping out Consumers Rights?, 64 TEX.
B.J. 917, 918 (2001) (noting a mandatory arbitration clause in an American Express
credit card contract that states American Express "has the exclusive right to choose the
arbitrator. Plaintiffs do not have the same right.").
194 See Vanessa Mitchell, Note, Mediation in Kentucky: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 87 KY. L.J. 463, 470 (1999). The system used to evaluate the mediator could be
used to "grade" them when they are being trained. Id.
195 American Arbitration Association, Consumer Procedures,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28752 (last visited May 13, 2009) ("Using its Consumer
Due Process Protocol, the AAA offers administration services for disputes where there is
a disagreement between individual consumers and businesses. The AAA applies the
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes - a supplement to the
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures that includes a glossary of ADR
terms - when arbitration clauses exist in agreements between individual consumers and
businesses where the business has a standardized, systematic application of arbitration
clauses with customers and where the terms and conditions of the purchase of
standardized, consumable goods or services are non-negotiable or primarily non-
negotiable in most or all of its terms, conditions, features, or choices. The product or
service must be for personal or household use.").
196 American Arbitration Association, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono
Arbitrators Services, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22040 (last visited May 13, 2009).197 Id.
198 T.J. Costello, Pre-litigation Mediation as a Privacy Policy: Exploring the
Interaction of Economics and Privacy, MEDIATE.COM, April 2004,
http://mediate.com/articles/costellotjl.cftn (last visited May 13, 2009) ("From an
economic standpoint, mediation, if conducted prior to filing a formal lawsuit, is a cost-
effective form of dispute resolution. Pre-litigation mediation reduces direct costs and
indirect costs, saves time, and more than likely helps retain relationships .... Legal costs
for businesses, governmental institutions and individuals alike have the potential of being
burdensome and can be reduced through pre-litigation mediation.").
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Mediation is private and confidential so the payday loan industry will not
have to deal with publicity or public record. 199 Mediation also allows the
parties to design their own solution, which may be cheaper than what a judge
or arbitrator decides. Additionally, if the payday loan companies use local
representatives, cost will be cheaper than arbitration, which generally
requires attorneys, whereas mediation does not.200 Further, the resolution of
cases is faster through mediation versus arbitration because there is no
waiting for the arbitrator to research and write a decision.20 1
One drawback to mediation that may be especially relevant to payday
loan contract disputes is that power differentials between the parties can
influence the mediation.202 This has been remedied in many jurisdictions by
requiring mediators to be certified203 or abide by a code of professionalism
that guarantees a fair and neutral process. 204 Court sponsored mediation may
also be unfair if a mediator tries too hard to settle a case.205 In order to ensure
the mediator does not push unfair settlement, facilitative mediation should be
used in solving payday lending disputes.
2. What is Facilitative Mediation and Why is it Good for
Payday Lending Disputes?
The chosen neutral should use a facilitative mediation style for the
payday lending dispute. In facilitative mediation, mediators use processes
199 This is good for the industry although it may not be good for precedent or society
in general. See Brenowitz, supra note 94, at 680.
200 Nancy C. House, Grievance Mediation. AT&T's Experience, 43 Lab. L.J. 491,
494 (1992), available at
http://www.mrep.org/mediation/booksarticles/housearticle.htm ("In addition to the
lower cost for mediators as opposed to arbitrators (resulting from less time spent, not
from any material difference in daily fees), there are also no attorney fees, no court
reporter or transcript, no hotel conference facilities, and no witness expenses .... I
understand that the average cost for mediating a single grievance for many companies is
around $350. For AT&T, the average cost is considerably higher than that since our labor
managers must travel from Atlanta to wherever the grievant is located. Our figure is
around $900. However, this is still much cheaper than arbitration, which for us requires
an attorney from New Jersey and a labor manager from Atlanta for both preparation and
hearing time.").
201 Id.
202 See Zwetkoff, supra note 187, at 373.
203 See Sharon Press, Institutionalization.: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 903, 909-12 (1994).
204 Zwetkoff, supra note 187, at 373.
205 Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice? 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 759
(2001).
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that assist parties in arriving at their own resolution and refrain from
presenting their own ideas on the case.20 6 Facilitative mediators assume that
parties can collect their own information so their primary role is to help
parties communicate with each other and agree on a solution. 20 7 The
facilitative model is in contrast to the evaluative model of mediation where
mediators add their own views on the strengths and weaknesses of the
parties' positions and may provide a legal assessment of the claim.208
Facilitative mediation is ideal for payday lending disputes because
people generally prefer this mode of mediation over adjudicative models.20 9
In particular, people favor a facilitative method because it consigns neutrals
to simply facilitating the disputants in coming to their own ideas for
resolution. 210 The facilitative process can be used without a lawyer
representing the payday loan customer because the lawyer cannot necessarily
voice the concerns of the client precisely and having a voice is essential to
feeling as though the mediation process was fair.211 In fact, disputants who
consider themselves to be of a lower social status did not indicate a
preference for the help of a representative. 212
A possible con to facilitative mediation is that the parties will not receive
information from the mediator about how the case might be resolved in
litigation or the substantive law that governs the dispute the parties will be
guided in resolving the problem on their own.213 Facilitative mediation could
also be too passive and inefficient as compared with other methods of dispute
resolution. 214 Additionally, the decision the parties agree to could be contrary
to standards of fairness and mediators may not have the ability to protect the
206 See Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211,
224 (2004).
207 Cris M. Currie, Mediating Off the Grid, 59 DisP. RESOL. J. 9, 10 (2003).
208 Shestowsky, supra note 206, at 224.
209 Id. at 245-46. In fact, only 10% of the people who participated in a study where
they took part in different types of mediations and arbitrations preferred a different
method better than a facilitative method. "In particular, because these configurations
suggest a preference for relegating third parties to assisting the disputants in arriving at
their own ideas for resolution (common in facilitative mediation) rather than proposing
resolutions that the disputants can then either accept or reject (common in evaluative
mediation), they suggest a preference for the facilitative form of mediation." Id. at 245.
210 Id.
211 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice
Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 840-41 (2001).
212 Shestowsky, supra note 206, at 247.
213 See id. at 225.
214 Currie, supra note 207, at 10.
[Vol. 24:2 20091
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN PAYDAY LENDING LOANS
weaker party.215 These disadvantages can be remedied by mediation sessions
that concentrate on procedural justice.
3. Court-Sponsored Mediation of Payday Loan Disputes Should
Concentrate on Procedural Justice
Since the mediation process is more flexible than the arbitration process,
the mediator should focus on procedural justice more than distributive
justice. "Procedural justice is concerned with the fairness of the procedures or
processes that are used to arrive at outcomes" in contrast with distributive
justice, which "focuses on perceptions of and criteria to determine the
substantive fairness of the outcomes themselves." 216 A person's perception
about the fairness of the procedure affects their judgment about the
distributive outcome, their willingness to comply with the outcome, and their
confidence in the legitimacy of the institution that offered the mediation.217
The legitimacy aspect is especially important when mediation is connected to
courts, since the authority of the court is based on its legitimacy in the eyes
of the public.
Procedural justice is imperative to payday loan customers who want to
tell their story. Research has shown that disputants believe the outcome of the
mediation is just when they are allowed to tell their story to a neutral party
who considers the story with respect and makes a rational decision based on
both sides of the disputants' accounts.218 Offering a voice to payday loan
victims will make them feel as though the court system and mediation
respects their value as people, which is important to feeling as though justice
has been served no matter the outcome.219
An additional way to instill procedural justice into court-sponsored
mediation besides allowing the disputants to have a voice and following
facilitative mediation methods is to dispose of caucuses and concentrate on
215 Zena D. Zumeta, Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative and
Transformative Mediation, http://leam2mediate.com/resources/nafcm.php#procon. (last
visited May 13, 2009).
216 Welsh, supra note 211, at 817.
217 Id.
218 See id. ("Disputants use the following indicia to assess procedural justice:
whether the procedure provided them with the opportunity to tell their stories, whether
the third party considered their stories, and whether the third party treated them in an
even-handed and dignified manner. The procedures used in socially-sanctioned dispute
resolution processes assume such significance because disputants seek personal and
pragmatic reassurance. Disputants need to believe.., that the final outcome of a dispute
resolution process will be based on full information.").
219 Id. (noting that disputants need to know they are valued members of society).
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joint sessions. 220 When neutrals meet only with one party at a time in
separate consecutive caucuses, the mediation is apt to turn into deal-
brokering instead of a fair process for both sides.22' Initial joint-meetings can
be uncomfortable but disputants are more reassured that an outcome is fair
when they are able to interact with the mediator face-to-face and make sure
that the neutral is getting accurate information from both sides. 222
In procedural justice, the over-riding concentration is on allowing the
disputants to tell their story, which can lead to more creative outcomes than
simply money damages.223 A discussion of each disputant's essential
interests and wishes makes it more likely that unique and non-money
agreements will be reached.224 Even if monetary compensation is the method
of justice that is agreed upon by the parties (which is most likely in payday
loan contract disputes), the parties will feel as though they have "experienced
justice."225 A focus on procedural justice is ideal for payday loan contract
disputes because consumers will be offered a dispute resolution method that
they can afford, have a choice in, and feel as though they have been served
justice in the end.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mandatory arbitration clauses in payday lending contracts allow
consumers to sign away their right to a public trial in front of their peers for
private arbitration sessions where the final decision is made by a company
chosen arbitrator. These arbitration clauses decrease faith in the dispute
resolution system and harm unsophisticated borrowers. Since it is unlikely
that Congress or the federal court system will come up with a proficient
answer in the near future, consumers need protection now. As such, payday
loan contract disputes should go to court-sponsored mediation instead of
private mandatory arbitration.
220 Id. at 851.
221 Id. at 852.
222 See Welsh, supra note 211, at 852.
223 See id. at 855-56.
224 Id. at 856.
225 Id.
348
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